| ID | 154378 |
| Title Proper | Ethiopian post-transition security sector reform experience |
| Other Title Information | building a national army from a revolutionary democratic army |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Berhe, Mulugeta Gebrehiwot ; Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article aims to chronicle and analyse the transformation of the army of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) into a national army following its military and political triumph in 1991. The history of a modern army in Ethiopia is recent, beginning with the end of the Second World War. Since then, the Ethiopian army has gone through major changes under different regimes. However, it is only the latest version of the national army that has a properly organised military doctrine and strategy. Prior to this, the army’s concept of operations was shaped by the doctrines and strategies of its foreign sponsors. The organisation of the imperial army was influenced by the doctrine and strategy of Western armies (initially the British and later the Americans); the army’s concept of operations during the military regime was shaped by Soviet senior military advisors. The EPRDF army was an insurgent army that developed into a conventional army with its own set of military and military–political institutions, including its own military doctrine and its own concept of the science and art of war. The transition of the EPRDF army into a national army is a unique example of restructuring a people’s army into a national military, something rarely if ever attempted with this kind of comprehensiveness. |
| `In' analytical Note | African Security Review Vol. 26, No.2; Jun 2017: p.161-179 |
| Journal Source | African Security Review Vol: 26 No 2 |
| Key Words | Army ; Doctrine ; Civil–Military Relations ; Civilian ; Partisan ; Defence Review |