Item Details
Skip Navigation Links
   ActiveUsers:763Hits:21639060Skip Navigation Links
Show My Basket
Contact Us
IDSA Web Site
Ask Us
Today's News
HelpExpand Help
Advanced search

In Basket
  Journal Article   Journal Article
 

ID155055
Title ProperNuclear beliefs
Other Title Informationa leader-focused theory of counter-proliferation
LanguageENG
AuthorWhitlark, Rachel Elizabeth
Summary / Abstract (Note)Why do some leaders use preventive military force to destroy another country's nuclear program, while others do not? Despite nuclear proliferation becoming a growing source of concern, counter-proliferation decision making remains poorly understood. Additionally, though the preventive logic pervades the scholarship as one potential state response to relative decline, it remains unclear when this leads to war and when it does not, especially in the nuclear context. This article demonstrates that the decision to consider and use preventive force rests not only on material factors but more importantly on a leader's prior beliefs about nuclear proliferation and the threat posed by a specific adversary. Conducting original archival research and process tracing, this manuscript examines American decision making against the Communist Chinese nuclear program, and demonstrates that Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson held fundamentally different nuclear beliefs that led to radically different preventive war preferences.
`In' analytical NoteSecurity Studies Vol. 26, No.4; Oct-Dec 2017: p.545-574
Journal SourceSecurity Studies Vol: 26 No 4
Key WordsCounter-Proliferation ;  Nuclear Beliefs ;  Leader-Focused Theory


 
 
Media / Other Links  Full Text