ID | 155187 |
Title Proper | Domestic signaling of commitment credibility |
Other Title Information | military recruitment and alliance formation |
Language | ENG |
Author | Stam, Allan C ; Horowitz, Michael C ; Poast, Paul |
Summary / Abstract (Note) | We provide a new perspective on how domestic factors shape the prospects for international cooperation. Internal arms, specifically conscription, signal a willingness and suitability to be a dependable ally. Possessing ineffective military forces inhibits a state’s ability to assist prospective allies and renders a state less able to deter threats on its own. This exemplifies an instance where the trade-off between arms and allies does not apply. Using new data on the military recruitment policies of states since 1816, we find that adopting a conscription-based recruitment system in the previous five years makes a state more likely to form an alliance in the current year, even when accounting for a heightened threat environment. |
`In' analytical Note | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 61, No.8; Sep 2017: p.1682-1710 |
Journal Source | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol: 61 No 8 |
Key Words | Conflict ; Alliance ; Domestic Politics ; Militarized Interstate Disputes |