| ID | 156251 |
| Title Proper | Pseudo change |
| Other Title Information | China’s strategic calculations and policy toward North Korea after pyongyang’s 4th nuclear test |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Kim, Jih-Un |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | After North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test in January 2016, China’s response was stern enough for certain China analysts to posit that the Middle Kingdom’s approach to its Cold War ally was changing. In reality, however, China’s imports from North Korea, especially coal, a crucial mineral for the North’s income but banned by United Nations (UN) Resolution 2270, did not decrease. Politically, China also strived to maintain mutual relations with North Korea. Based on its strategic and other cost-benefit calculations, Beijing needs to maintain economic and political ties with Pyongyang and thus has no incentive to seriously observe the U.N. resolution. In this context, China is expected to virtually repeat the gestures it made in the past in dealing with the North. Under these circumstances, sanctioning North Korea through China is not considered a viable option in tackling the nuclear issue; rather, the USA and South Korea should change their policy approach toward this problem. |
| `In' analytical Note | East Asia: An International Quaterly Vol. 34, No.3; Sep 2017: p.163–178 |
| Journal Source | East Asia: An International Quaterly Vol: 34 No 3 |
| Key Words | China ; North Korea ; Nuclear test ; U.N. Sanctions ; Strategic Cost and Benefit |