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ID156448
Title ProperPowerful chief executive officers and firm performance
Other Title Informationintegrating agency and stewardship theory
LanguageENG
AuthorFung, Hung-Gay ;  Qiao, Penghua ;  Fung, Anna ;  Miao, Jianchun
Summary / Abstract (Note)Do agency and stewardship behaviors coexist at firms, or does one dominate the other? We use data from listed companies in China over the period 2007–2016 to show that powerful chief executive officers (CEOs) simultaneously incur self-interested agency costs while acting as stewards to benefit the firm. In balancing the push-and-pull forces of stewardship and agency behaviors, powerful CEOs in Chinese firms ultimately improve short-term and long-term firm performance. Our results have important implications for understanding how CEOs affect firms and how cultural factors can motivate CEOs to work in the interest of the firm.
`In' analytical NoteChina and World Economy Vol. 25, No.6; Nov-Dec 2017: p.100–119
Journal SourceChina and World Economy 2017-12 25, 6
Key WordsPerformance ;  Agency Cost ;  Powerful CEO ;  Sterwardship