| ID | 156482 |
| Title Proper | Government–military relations in Israel |
| Other Title Information | who’s the boss? lessons from the six–day war |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Farago, Niv |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | In recent years, prominent voices in the Israeli academic and political arenas have
increased their criticism of the Israeli Defense Force’s (IDF) dominant role in policy
and decision-making processes in the country. The 1967 Six–Day War is perhaps
the bedrock upon which IDF critics’ fears of a dominant military rest upon. They
disapprove of the pressure that the military’s high command put on the government
to go to war and argue that the IDF was overly dominant in determining its
goals and strategic moves on the battlefield. The following analysis debunks the
claims of IDF critics by presenting historical evidence that shows how political
considerations overrode military calculations on the way to and during the war. It
also highlights the vital contribution of the IDF’s high command to decision-making
at significant crossroads. In this regard, the analysis uses organizational theory logic
to question the suggestion of IDF critics to empower the National Security Council
(NSC) so it could provide the government with alternative analyses and courses
of action to those suggested by the IDF. Significantly, the analysis concludes
that by empowering the NSC at the expense of the IDF, the government might
invite confusion rather than clarity and efficiency to policy and decision-making
processes, especially in times of crises and war—when quick decision and action
are necessary. |
| `In' analytical Note | Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol. 29, No.4; Dec 2017: p. 633－650 |
| Journal Source | Korean Journal of Defence Analysis Vol: 29 No 4 |
| Key Words | War ; Diplomacy ; Israel ; National security council ; Civil-Military Relation ; Strategy |