| ID | 156588 |
| Title Proper | Opening a proliferation Pandora's box |
| Other Title Information | the spread of the Soviet-type gas centrifuge |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Kemp, R Scott |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Some scholars have suggested that illicit state-to-state technology transfer and black-market activities are the primary vectors by which technically weak states acquire nuclear weapons. However, a more recent literature has questioned this view, arguing that natural technological change and public-domain information have been potentially more important enablers of proliferation. Articles supporting this perspective have examined gas centrifuge programs in emerging nuclear powers and failed proliferators. This article examines how viable centrifuge-engineering information first circulated and eventually entered the public domain. It then traces the adoption of this technology in nine latent proliferators: countries that are not known to have pursued nuclear weapons immediately, but which nonetheless became capable of making them. The histories of these programs reinforce the argument that public-domain information and basic technology are adequate for proliferation and cannot be reliably limited by technology controls or secrecy. |
| `In' analytical Note | Nonproliferation Review Vol. 24, No.1-2; Feb-Mar 2017: p.101-127 |
| Journal Source | Nonproliferation Review Vol: 24 No 1-2 |
| Key Words | proliferation ; Export controls ; Technology Transfer ; Nonproliferation |