| ID | 159183 |
| Title Proper | When do citizens take costly action against government corruption? evidence from experiments in australia, singapore, and the united states |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Yap, O Fiona |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | When do citizens take costly collective action against government corruption? When citizens act in concert, their demands are credible and not easily discounted by governments, which should be more likely to respond. In this study, we use the stag-hunt game, supplemented by Granovetter's threshold model of collective action, to investigate the conditions under which citizens coordinate to collectively act against government corruption. We use survey experiments in laboratory settings in Australia, Singapore, and the United States. The results show several conditions motivate participants to pursue collective action; using the wellspring of the theoretical argument, they clarify that information that others pursue collective action, together with clear mutual benefits as measured by rewards, are primary motivators of the individual's choice. Correspondingly, other considerations, including initial costs or final potential penalties, do not bear on the individual's choice. The findings have implications not only for the empirical literature on policy but also for policy debates on how to control it. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of East Asian Studies Vol. 17, No.1; Mar 2017: p.119-136 |
| Journal Source | Journal of East Asian Studies Vol: 17 No 1 |
| Key Words | Collective Action ; Experiment ; Citizens' Response ; Stag-Hunt Game ; Granovetter's Threshold Model |