| ID | 159502 |
| Title Proper | Businesspeople in elected office |
| Other Title Information | identifying private benefits from firm-level returns |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Szakonyi, David ; DAVID SZAKONYI (a1) |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Do businesspeople who win elected office use their positions to help their firms? Business leaders become politicians around the world, yet we know little about whether their commitment to public service trumps their own private interests. Using an original dataset of 2,703 firms in Russia, I employ a regression discontinuity design to identify the causal effect of firm directors winning seats in subnational legislatures from 2004 to 2013. First, having a connection to a winning politician increases a firm’s revenue by 60% and profitability by 15% over a term in office. I then test between different mechanisms, finding that connected firms improve their performance by gaining access to bureaucrats and not by signaling legitimacy to financiers. The value of winning a seat increases in more politically competitive regions but falls markedly when more businesspeople win office in a convocation. Politically connected firms extract fewer benefits when faced with greater competition from other rent-seekers. |
| `In' analytical Note | American Political Science Review Vol. 112, No.2; May 2018: p. 322-338 |
| Journal Source | American Political Science Review 2018-04 112, 2 |
| Key Words | Businesspeople ; Elected Office ; Identifying Private Benefits ; Firm-Level Returns |