ID | 160350 |
Title Proper | Who Restrains Who? |
Other Title Information | Sino-DPRK Strategic Interaction During the Second Nuclear Crisis |
Language | ENG |
Author | Song Wenzhi and Son Daekwon ; Wenzhi, Song ; Daekwon, Son |
Summary / Abstract (Note) | This paper seeks to find an answer to the question of why China’s effort to curb North Korea’s nuclear development has failed to produce expected outcomes. Since the second North Korean nuclear crisis in 2002, China, as the most, if not sole, influential country to North Korea, has been attempting to restrain the North’s nuclear armament. Nevertheless, Beijing has always failed to sustain its pressure on Pyongyang long enough to restrain Pyongyang’s nuclear ambition; instead, it has often ended up with China’s appeasement policy. Witnessing such failure, some scholars assert that Beijing is able, but not willing, to curb Pyongyang’s nuclear armament, while others claim that Beijing’s leverage over Pyongyang is a lot more limited than widely thought. Yet, both schools of thought, focusing narrowly on China’s capability or willingness to restrain North Korea, has failed to depict a full picture. By contrast, this study, employing a game theory approach, views Sino–DPRK relations as a strategic interaction between restrainer and restrainee. It argues that North Korea’s tactical deception and military adventurism shuffle China’s political priorities on the Korean peninsula, thereby preventing China from pressuring North Korea. |
`In' analytical Note | Korean Journal of Defence Analysis Vol. 30, No.2; Jun 2018: p.231-246
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Journal Source | Korean Journal of Defence Analysis Vol: 30 No 2 |
Key Words | China ; North Korea ; Restraint ; Appeasement ; The Second Nuclear Crisis |