| ID | 162216 |
| Title Proper | Who Polices the Administrative State? |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | LOWANDE, KENNETH |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Scholarship on oversight of the bureaucracy typically conceives of legislatures as unitary actors. But most oversight is conducted by individual legislators who contact agencies directly. I acquire the correspondence logs of 16 bureaucratic agencies and re-evaluate the conventional proposition that ideological disagreement drives oversight. I identify the effect of this disagreement by exploiting the transition from George Bush to Barack Obama, which shifted the ideological orientation of agencies through turnover in agency personnel. Contrary to existing research, I find ideological conflict has a negligible effect on oversight, whereas committee roles and narrow district interests are primary drivers. The findings may indicate that absent incentives induced by public auditing, legislator behavior is driven by policy valence concerns rather than ideology. The results further suggest collective action in Congress may pose greater obstacles to bureaucratic oversight than previously thought. |
| `In' analytical Note | American Political Science Review Vol. 112, No.4; Nov 2018: p.874-890 |
| Journal Source | American Political Science Review 2018-10 112, 4 |
| Key Words | Administrative State |