Item Details
Skip Navigation Links
   ActiveUsers:1080Hits:21175165Skip Navigation Links
Show My Basket
Contact Us
IDSA Web Site
Ask Us
Today's News
HelpExpand Help
Advanced search

In Basket
  Journal Article   Journal Article
 

ID162681
Title ProperNuclear weapons, existential threats, and the stability–instability paradox
LanguageENG
AuthorAsal, Victor ;  Early, Bryan R ;  Bryan R. Early & Victor Asal
Summary / Abstract (Note)Recent scholarship has largely ignored systematic differences in the existential threats that nuclear-weapon possessors pose to other states. This study theorizes that the capacity to pose existential threats shapes nuclear-armed states’ willingness to use military force against one another. We explore three hypotheses regarding how nuclear-based existential threats can deter conflict or encourage it, including under the conditions proposed by the stability–instability paradox. We rely on a statistical analysis of nuclear-armed dyads from 1950 to 2001 and employ the Nuclear Annihilation Threat (NAT) Index to capture variation in the existential threats nuclear-armed states pose to one another. We find that being able to pose an existential threat to another state emboldens potential initiators to use military force but does not deter attacks. The emboldening effects are particularly strong under the hypothesized conditions of the stability–instability paradox. Our study provides unique contributions to ongoing debates over the political effects of nuclear weapons.
`In' analytical NoteNonproliferation Review Vol. 25, No.3-4; Jun-Jul 2018: p.223-247
Journal SourceNonproliferation Review Vol: 25 No 3-4
Key WordsConflict ;  Nuclear Weapons ;  Deterrence ;  Existential Threats ;  Stability–Instability Paradox


 
 
Media / Other Links  Full Text