| ID | 164708 |
| Title Proper | Lessons from VOSTOK-2018: free-play manoeuvers are overrated and mission-command needs to be bounded |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Raitasalo, Jyri |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Analyzing Russia’s VOSTOK 2018 strategic level field-exercise (or “strategic manoeuvers”) in the West from a Western perspective is hard. A key reason for this is that Western and Russian perspectives on war and the use of military force have grown apart. By this, Russia is still focused on traditional notions of mass, i.e. massed troops and firepower brought to bear on the enemy to achieve tactical/operational victory. Conversely, most Western states have turned their thinking to effect precision engagement, using high-tech situational awareness and C4 capabilities with small(er), professional and highly lethal forces. For the last 25 years, much of the Western focus on warfare has highlighted force-protection and the avoidance of collateral damage in expeditionary operations that have little to do with vital national security interests. This deviates completely from the Russian perspective: causing maximal casualties and destruction in order to prevail in the battlefield (to wit: observe Eastern Ukraine). In short, today the very expensive Western precision warfare meets attrition warfare and decisive battles would enjoin to produce the ultimate use of violence. |
| `In' analytical Note | Defense and Security Analysis Vol. 35, No.1; Mar 2019: p.106-107 |
| Journal Source | Defense and Security Analysis Vol: 35 No 1 |
| Key Words | VOSTOK-2018 |