| ID | 165093 |
| Title Proper | How long until midnight? intelligence-policy relations and the United States response to the Israeli nuclear program, 1959–1985 |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Long, Austin G ; Shifrinson, Joshua R |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Why did the United States fail to stop Israeli acquisition of nuclear weapons? Existing research argues that patrons such as the U.S. should have an easy time halting proliferation by militarily and economically vulnerable clients. Nevertheless, Israel acquired nuclear weapons with relatively little American opposition. Utilizing extensive primary source research, we argue that problematic intelligence-policy relations hindered U.S. efforts to arrest Israeli proliferation as (1) policymakers often gave mixed guidance to the intelligence community, resulting in (2) limited information on Israeli efforts that reinforced policy ambiguity. The results carry implications for understanding the dynamics of nuclear proliferation and intelligence-policy relations. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 42, No.1; Feb 2019: p.55-90 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Strategic Studies Vol: 42 No 1 |
| Key Words | Nuclear Weapons ; proliferation ; Intelligence ; Israe ; U.S. Foreign Policy |