Item Details
Skip Navigation Links
   ActiveUsers:2736Hits:21028837Skip Navigation Links
Show My Basket
Contact Us
IDSA Web Site
Ask Us
Today's News
HelpExpand Help
Advanced search

In Basket
  Journal Article   Journal Article
 

ID165229
Title ProperPresidentialization and procedural rules change
Other Title Informationthe case of the South Korean national assembly
LanguageENG
AuthorLee, Hojun
Summary / Abstract (Note)The common assumption of legislative politics is that the majority party structures procedural rules to suit its interests. In a presidentialized context, however, presidential electoral incentives prevail over majority party's incentives when voting on procedural rules changes and the threat of punishing majority-party defectors is not credible when those defectors vote with the presidential candidate. To test these claims, I analyze the case of the procedural reform in the South Korean National Assembly. The case study reveals that 1) the leading presidential candidate of the ruling majority Saenuri Party compromised on the procedural reform bill that imposes restrictions on the majority party's cartel arrangement due to presidential electoral incentives; 2) a significant number of Saenuri Party members defected from the majority of their co-partisans to vote with the presidential candidate; and 3) career advancement ratio and re-nomination ratios demonstrate that those defectors were not punished afterwards.
`In' analytical NoteJournal of East Asian Studies Vol. 19, No.1; Mar 2019: p.111-129
Journal SourceJournal of East Asian Studies Vol: 19 No 1
Key WordsProcedural Reform ;  Presidentialization ;  Procedural Cartel Theory ;  Presidential Faction ;  South Korean National Assembly


 
 
Media / Other Links  Full Text