| ID | 165549 |
| Title Proper | Paradox in Polarization? Cross-pressured Representatives and the Missing Incentive to Moderate |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Toll, Benjamin T |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Members of the public are often left choosing between two extreme candidates who will not represent the moderate, aggregate, public effectively. Cross-pressured members of the U.S. Congress serve a constituency that votes for the opposite party at the national level. If there is any group of representatives that have an incentive to moderate their voting behavior, it is cross-pressured members. In this article, I show that cross-pressured members are more moderate than the average member of their party. This could provide constraints on rampant partisanship in the form of districts that are comfortable electing a representative of one party and voting for the president of the other. However, I show that these members are significantly less likely to be reelected. Thus a paradox exists in which cross-pressured members who moderate their voting behavior are no more likely to be rewarded for behaving the way citizens claim they want to represent. |
| `In' analytical Note | World Affairs US Vol. 182, No.1; Sprinng 2019: p. 61-96 |
| Journal Source | World Affairs US Vol: 182 No 1 |
| Key Words | Political Parties ; United States ; Moderation ; Polarization ; Representation ; Congress ; Partisanship ; House of Representatives ; Moderate ; Cross-pressured Congressmen |