Item Details
Skip Navigation Links
   ActiveUsers:2172Hits:21000662Skip Navigation Links
Show My Basket
Contact Us
IDSA Web Site
Ask Us
Today's News
HelpExpand Help
Advanced search

In Basket
  Journal Article   Journal Article
 

ID165885
Title ProperMilitarized Disputes, Uncertainty, and Leader Tenure
LanguageENG
AuthorSpaniel, William ;  Smith, Bradley C ;  Bradley C. Smith
Summary / Abstract (Note)How do new leaders impact crisis negotiations? We argue that opposing states know less about such a leader’s resolve over the issues at stake. To fully appreciate the consequences, we develop a multi-period bargaining model of negotiations. In equilibrium, as a proposer becomes close to certain of its opponent’s type, the duration and intensity of war goes to 0. We then test whether increase in leader tenure decrease the duration of militarized interstate disputes. Our estimates indicate that crises involving new leaders are 25.3 percent more likely to last one month than crises involving leaders with four years of tenure. Moreover, such conflicts are more likely to result in higher fatality levels. These results further indicate that leader tenure is a useful proxy for uncertainty.
`In' analytical NoteJournal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 63, No.5; May 2019: p.1222-1252
Journal SourceJournal of Conflict Resolution Vol: 63 No 5
Key WordsConflict ;  Game Theory ;  Domestic Politics ;  Leader Turnover


 
 
Media / Other Links  Full Text