| ID | 166867 |
| Title Proper | Nuclear-armed North Korea without ICBMs |
| Other Title Information | the best achievable objective |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Zhang, Hongyu |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article analyzes the North Korean nuclear crisis from a balance-of-power perspective. It is in the long-term interests of international peace for a secure and independent North Korea to serve as a buffer between US and Chinese ground forces. However, the conventional military advantage of the South Korean-American alliance over North Korea has grown drastically since the end of the Cold War, threatening North Korea’s survival. Since North Korea lacks any reliable ally, nuclear weapons represent its most cost-effective way to restore a balance of power and thus secure itself. Accepting security guarantees in exchange for its nuclear arsenal is rhetorically appealing but not a viable approach. North Korea’s development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), however, has overcompensated for the post-Cold War imbalance, inviting talk in Washington of waging a preventive war. Persuading North Korea to give up its ICBM capability, not its nuclear arsenal, should therefore be the primary objective of US diplomacy. |
| `In' analytical Note | Nonproliferation Review Vol. 26, No.1-2; Feb-Mar 2019: p.143-153 |
| Journal Source | Nonproliferation Review Vol: 26 No 1-2 |
| Key Words | Regional Security ; Disarmament ; Balance of power ; Realism ; Missiles ; East Asia ; North Korea |