| ID | 169455 |
| Title Proper | Deferred verification |
| Other Title Information | verifiable declarations of fissile-material stocks for disarmament purposes |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Podvig, pavel ; Rodgers, Joseph |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Nuclear disarmament is often seen as eventually requiring access to nuclear warheads or to the warhead-dismantlement process to verify that a state has not hidden weapons or weapon-materials despite promising to disarm. This article suggests this view is misplaced, and that what is needed is a verification mechanism able to provide reliable assurances of the absence of fissile materials available for use in weapons after a state has disarmed. Such a mechanism will need an initial declaration of the amount of fissile materials held by a state for all purposes, military and civilian. In a state with a nuclear arsenal awaiting elimination, this declaration would have to include materials that may not be available for verification because they are in nuclear weapons or are in other classified or proliferation-sensitive forms. This article describes a verification arrangement that does not require access to materials in weapons and in sensitive forms while still allowing checks on the overall accuracy of the declaration. Verification of the completeness and correctness of the declaration is deferred to the time when the weapons-relevant material enters the disposition process, at which point it no longer has any sensitive attributes. By removing the focus on monitoring warheads and dismantlement, this new approach could provide a more manageable path to nuclear disarmament. |
| `In' analytical Note | Nonproliferation Review Vol. 26, No.3-4; Jun-Jul 2019: p. |
| Journal Source | Nonproliferation Review Vol: 26 No 3-4 |
| Key Words | Disarmament ; Verification ; Fissile Materials ; Dismantlement ; Fissile-Material Cut-Off Treaty |