| ID | 169873 |
| Title Proper | Impact of the under enforcement of RPS in China |
| Other Title Information | an evolutionary approach |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Fang, Debin |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The implementation of renewable portfolio standards (RPS) in China is limited by the interests of the sector being regulated. Power companies generally lack the incentive to generate renewable power. They can be expected to resist the implementation of RPS standards, which will in turn affect the successful implementation of the RPS policy. Thus studying the strategic interaction and co-evolution between the government and power companies under the RPS regulation is of great importance. |
| `In' analytical Note | Energy Policy , No.135;Dec 2019: p.111021 |
| Journal Source | Energy Policy 2019-12 |
| Key Words | Regulation ; Evolutionary Game ; Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) ; Subsidy and Punishment Mechanism |