| ID | 170032 |
| Title Proper | Diplomatic Presentation of the State in International Crises |
| Other Title Information | Diplomatic Collaboration during the US-Iran Hostage Crisis |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Banks, David E |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Theories of crisis (de-)escalation often focus on conflict, stress, and information problems. However, crisis (de-)escalation may sometimes hinge on how de-escalation is interpreted by domestic audiences. In this article, I combine Putnam's two-level games model of diplomacy with Erving Goffman's concepts of interaction order and face to create a mechanism I call “diplomatic presentation.” I show how diplomatic presentation can be instrumental for the crafting of diplomatic outcomes that states believe are in their mutual interest but that run the risk of being rejected by their domestic publics. Successful diplomatic presentation requires that states collude together to manage their performance, engage in teamwork, and control the impact of unsympathetic audiences. In evaluating this mechanism, I analyze the diplomacy surrounding the Iran Hostage Crisis. During this crisis, regime officials from the United States and Iran colluded in a theatrical “scenario,” in which both sides adopted specific roles in order to satisfy the sentiments of US and Iranian publics. I show that complications regarding the presentation of this scenario explain escalation of the crisis better than prominent alternatives. This argument contributes to the growing literature on symbolic diplomacy in international relations, while also challenging common assumptions about the adversarial nature of crises. |
| `In' analytical Note | International Studies Quarterly Vol. 63, No.4; Dec 2019: p. 1163–1174 |
| Journal Source | International Studies Quarterly Vol: 63 No 4 |
| Key Words | International crises ; Diplomatic Presentation ; US-Iran Hostage Crisis |