| ID | 170403 |
| Title Proper | Economic containment as a strategy of Great Power competition |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Kim, Dong Jung |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Economic containment has garnered repeated attention in the discourse about the United States' response to China. Yet, the attributes of economic containment as a distinct strategy of Great Power competition remain unclear. Moreover, the conditions under which a leading power can employ economic containment against a challenging power remain theoretically unelaborated. This article first suggests that economic containment refers to the use of economic policies to weaken the targeted state's material capacity to start military aggression, rather than to influence the competitor's behaviour over a specific issue. Then, this article suggests that economic containment becomes a viable option when the leading power has the ability to inflict more losses on the challenging power through economic restrictions, and this ability is largely determined by the availability of alternative economic partners. When the leading power cannot effectively inflict more losses on the challenging power due to the presence of alternative economic partners, it is better off avoiding economic containment. The author substantiates these arguments through case-studies of the United States' responses to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The article concludes by examining the nature of the United States' recent economic restrictions against China. |
| `In' analytical Note | International Affairs Vol. 95, No.6; Nov 2019: p.1423–1441 |
| Journal Source | International Affairs Vol: 95 No 6 |
| Key Words | Conflict ; Security ; Defence ; International Relations Theory ; Political Economy and Economics |