| ID | 170898 |
| Title Proper | Managing the 1986-87 Sino-Indian Sumdorong Chu Crisis |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Pardesi, Manjeet S |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | How did China and India manage to prevent the 1986-87 Sumdorong Chu Crisis from escalating into a war? I argue that it was a combination of changing geopolitical factors (Sino-Soviet rapprochement and the end of Soviet support for India in the context of Sino-Indian tensions) and military factors (conventional deterrence and perceptions of limited revisionism) that help explain crisis management. While these geopolitical and military factors helped avert immediate escalation, the crisis truly ended only after China and India sought a new modus vivendi during Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s landmark trip to China in December 1988. The absence of great power (Soviet) support meant that India had to make a costly signal to China in the form of Gandhi’s trip that happened during the 1987-89 cycle of protests in Tibet against Chinese rule. Nevertheless, Gandhi’s visit took place after India had demonstrated its military strength and resolve in its ability to defend the status quo on the border, and therefore should not be interpreted as a sign of weakness. In other words, I argue that successful deterrence requires broader foreign policy reorientation. At the same time, considerations of power (in the form of internal/external balancing) are central to strategic stability in the Sino-Indian dyad, and that any recourse to diplomacy that ignores the realities of military power is unlikely to be successful for crisis managemen |
| `In' analytical Note | India Review Vol. 18, No.5, 2019; p 534-551 |
| Journal Source | India Review Vol; 18 No 5 |
| Key Words | Border ; Strategic Stability ; Sino-Indian ; Foreign Policy ; Crisis Management ; Sumdorong Chu Crisis |