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ID171789
Title ProperLeveraging towards restraint
Other Title InformationNuclear hedging and North Korea's shifting reference points during the agreed framework and the Six-Party Talks
LanguageENG
AuthorPark, Soul ;  Soul Park (a1) and Kimberly Peh ( ;  Peh, Kimberly
Summary / Abstract (Note)The emergence of new nuclear aspirants has posed a great threat to the post-Cold War global non-proliferation regime. These states have adopted a nuclear hedging strategy that has been deemed both strategically risky and politically difficult to maintain. Yet, hedging has not automatically resulted in nuclearisation. We analyse the conditions under which a nuclear hedger shifts its nuclear policy towards one of restraint. Drawing insights from prospect theory, we argue that a nuclear policy shift occurs when a nuclear hedger gains an asymmetric leverage vis-à-vis its adversary. Specifically, a hedging strategy that is based on loss aversion will only be abandoned when a shift in the nuclear aspirant's reference point occurs during negotiations. To test our theoretical arguments, we conduct an in-depth case study of North Korea's nuclear policies throughout the 1990s and 2000s. The empirical study of the changes in North Korea's negotiating stance during the Agreed Framework negotiations and the Six-Party Talks supports our asymmetric leverage thesis. We conclude with broad policy implications for the non-proliferation regime.
`In' analytical NoteEuropean Journal of International Security Vol. 5, No.1; Feb 2020: p.94-114
Journal SourceEuropean Journal of International Security Vol: 5 No 1
Key WordsNorth Korea ;  Nuclear Restraint ;  Six-Party Talks ;  Agreed Framework ;  Nuclear Hedging ;  Asymmetric Leverage


 
 
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