| ID | 171997 |
| Title Proper | Reluctant Reconciliation |
| Other Title Information | South Korea's tentative détente with North Korea in the Nixon era, 1969–72 |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | LYONG, CHOI |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | This article discusses the impact and implications of Sino-American reconciliation on South Korea's policy towards its conflict with North Korea as well as its effect on South Korean politics in the early 1970s. Specifically, this article will examine how the Park regime altered its policy toward the North in response to the demands of the Nixon administration, before discussing the limitations of the policy in terms of the hostile approach of the Park regime toward Pyongyang during its talks with North Korea in 1972.
Based on recent findings in the South Korean and American archives, and an interview with former KCIA official Gang Indeok, this article contends that this particular focus provides an interesting case study to explain the impact of global changes on the domestic politics of specific nation(s) during the Cold War era. Along with many other American client states, the Republic of Korea misunderstood the objective of the United States before Nixon announced his Doctrine in 1969 and intention to reduce American support for Park. To be sure, it was not Washington's intention to build a democratic country in the Korean Peninsula. Rather, as Westad has indicated, the superpower sought greater control over the world and the expansion and extension of its power. This short article will thus demonstrate the process by which the client states of the United States—in particular, South Korea—came to understand the real aims of Washington and learned how to utilize these American intentions for their own national interest. |
| `In' analytical Note | Modern Asian Studies Vol. 54, No.1; Jan 2020: p.59-94 |
| Journal Source | Modern Asian Studies 2020-02 54, 1 |
| Key Words | North Korea ; South Korea ; Reluctant Reconciliation ; Nixon Era ; 1969–72 |