Item Details
Skip Navigation Links
   ActiveUsers:800Hits:20886220Skip Navigation Links
Show My Basket
Contact Us
IDSA Web Site
Ask Us
Today's News
HelpExpand Help
Advanced search

In Basket
  Journal Article   Journal Article
 

ID173828
Title ProperStrategy bridge as the forgotten dimension of effective COIN
Other Title Informationthe case of Peru and Sendero
LanguageENG
AuthorMiron, Marina
Summary / Abstract (Note)This article examines the strategies employed – or not employed – in the Peruvian counterinsurgency campaign against the Sendero Luminoso insurgent group. Using Carl von Clausewitz’s and Colin Gray’s strategic theories as a lens through which to analyze the conflict, the aim here is to show what role strategy played in the eventual defeat of this insurgency and what obstacles the Peruvian state and its armed forces faced in enacting good strategy. Specifically, the utilization of the ‘strategy bridge’ concept is investigated. For a large part of this conflict, the strategy bridge linking the civil authorities with the military and its activities was missing. Once there emerged a clear understanding of the importance of ends, ways and means working in harmony could an effective counterinsurgency campaign flourish.
`In' analytical NoteSmall Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 31, No.1; Jan 2020: p.159-180
Journal SourceSmall Wars and Insurgencies Vol: 31 No 1
Key WordsCounterinsurgency ;  Military Strategy ;  Peru ;  Sendero Luminoso ;  Strategy Bridge ;  Marxist Insurgency ;  Clausewitzian Theory


 
 
Media / Other Links  Full Text