| ID | 174120 |
| Title Proper | Normalization by Other Means—Technological Infrastructure and Political Commitment in the North Korean Nuclear Crisis |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Lawrence, Christopher |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The 1994 Agreed Framework called for North Korea to dismantle its plutonium-production complex in exchange for civilian light water reactors (LWRs) and the promise of political normalization with the United States. The accord succeeded at rolling back North Korea's nuclear program, but the regime secretly began enriching uranium when the LWR project fell behind schedule. Today, scholars look back at the Agreed Framework as a U.S. offer of “carrots” to bribe the regime, but this framing overlooks the credibility challenges of normalization and the distinctive technical challenges of building LWRs in North Korea. A combiniation of political and technical analysis reveals how the LWR project helped build credibility for the political changes promised in the Agreed Framework. Under this interpretation, the LWR project created a platform for important breakthroughs in U.S.-North Korean engagement by signaling a U.S. commitment to normalization, but its signaling function was undercut when the United States displaced the costs of LWR construction to its allies. The real challenge of proliferation crisis diplomacy is not to bribe or coerce target states into giving up nuclear weapons, but to credibly signal a U.S. commitment to the long-term political changes needed to make denuclearization possible. |
| `In' analytical Note | International Security Vol. 45, No.1; Summer 2020: p.9-50 |
| Journal Source | International Security Vol: 45 No 1 |
| Key Words | Political Commitment ; North Korean Nuclear Crisis ; Technological Infrastructure |