Item Details
Skip Navigation Links
   ActiveUsers:1101Hits:21175941Skip Navigation Links
Show My Basket
Contact Us
IDSA Web Site
Ask Us
Today's News
HelpExpand Help
Advanced search

In Basket
  Journal Article   Journal Article
 

ID175399
Title ProperReforming International Organizations
Other Title InformationHow Partisanship and Ministerial Control Shape State Preferences toward the World Bank
LanguageENG
AuthorMahrenbach, Laura C ;  Eugénia C. Heldt 1 and Laura C. Mahrenbach 1 ;  Heldt, Eugénia C
Summary / Abstract (Note)Recent scholarship has highlighted the role of domestic pressures in determining state preferences toward the reform of international organizations (IO s). This article adds a new dimension by examining how partisanship and ministerial control affect state preferences toward IO empowerment. The article derives two expectations from the existing literature. First, partisan position will determine preferences toward IO empowerment. Second, when a government is constituted by multiple parties, the position of the party with the IO’s ministerial portfolio will determine the government’s position toward IO empowerment. The article illustrates this argument by examining the positions of four net donors (Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and two net recipients (Brazil and India) during the World Bank’s reforms. By bringing domestic politics back in, this article complements existing studies on the politics of IO reform and weighs in on central debates in comparative politics and international political economy.
`In' analytical NoteGlobal Governance Vol. 26, No.4; Oct-Dec 2020: p.601–627
Journal SourceGlobal Governance Vol: 26 No 4
Key WordsInternational Organizations ;  World Bank ;  Domestic Politics ;  Empowerment ;  Partisanship ;  State Preferences


 
 
Media / Other Links  Full Text