| ID | 178453 |
| Title Proper | Coercive Diplomacy and the Iranian Nuclear Crisis |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Harris, Benjamin |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Coercive diplomacy was utilized by a coalition of the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and Germany (collectively known as the P5+1) to negotiate an end to the Iranian nuclear crisis from 2002–2013. Eventually, this approach culminated in the Geneva interim agreement and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in November 2013 and October 2015, respectively. This article charts the course of the P5+1’s coercive diplomacy efforts against Iran and demonstrates that coercive diplomacy pressured Iran to a point where the cost of continued resistance was too high to continue enduring. It shows that a combination of factors succeeded after 11 years of a coercive diplomacy strategy. These findings will have implications for policymaking and academia, as it is a rare illustration of successful, coalitional coercive diplomacy. |
| `In' analytical Note | International Negotiation Vol. 26, No.2; 2021: p.218–244 |
| Journal Source | International Negotiation Vol: 26 No 2 |
| Key Words | Leadership ; Nuclear Crisis ; Incentives ; Coercion ; Crisis Management ; Coalitional Diplomacy |