| ID | 181672 |
| Title Proper | Pool or duel? cooperation and competition among international organizations |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Clark, Richard |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | International organizations (IOs) increasingly pool resources and expertise. Under what conditions do they pool rather than compete when their activities overlap? Drawing on elite interviews, I argue that even though many cooperation decisions are made by staff possessing high degrees of autonomy from member state principals, IOs are more likely to pool resources when their leading stakeholders are geopolitically aligned. Regardless of whether member states directly oversee the negotiation of these arrangements, staff design policies that are amenable to major stakeholders. I test this argument with regression analysis of an original data set that documents patterns of co-financing and information sharing among IOs in the development issue area. I further supplement these tests with an elite survey experiment deployed via LinkedIn to bureaucrats from various development IOs. Across the board, I find evidence consistent with my theory. |
| `In' analytical Note | International Organization Vol. 75, No.4; Fall 2021: p.1133 - 1153 |
| Journal Source | International Organization Vol: 75 No 4 |
| Key Words | Development ; International Organizations ; World Bank ; Regime Complexity |