| ID | 183694 |
| Title Proper | Quick on the Draw |
| Other Title Information | American Negativity Bias and Costly Signals in International Relations |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Kim, Seok Joon |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | States signal their intentions to domestic and foreign audiences but are not always believed. Why do people believe some state signals but not others? Using a survey experiment on a representative sample of the US public, this study finds that individuals have a negativity bias when assessing the credibility of state signals. They take other states’ aggressive actions as evidence of deep hostility but are skeptical of the credibility of conciliatory gestures. The experimental result shows that the mobilization of a small proportion of an army is perceived credible enough as an aggressive action, while the removal of even a large proportion is not perceived as conciliatory. The psychological mechanism found here is a strong foundation for theorizing about how individuals process information embedded in state signals and can improve our understanding of signaling. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 66, No.2; Feb-Mar 2022: p.246-271 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol: 66 No 2 |
| Key Words | Negativity Bias ; Costly Signal ; Survey Experiment ; Signaling Perception |