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ID183787
Title ProperSALT 50 Years On: Strategic Theory and Arms Control
LanguageENG
AuthorFreedman, Lawrence
Summary / Abstract (Note)This article addresses the relationship between the practice of arms control in the 1970s and strategic theory. Although the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is often described as an example of theory-directed arms control, this article shows that ballistic-missile defences were a poor investment because of the ease with which they could be overwhelmed by offensive systems, especially with multiple warheads. The Nixon administration constructed a rationale for anti-ballistic missiles based on the need to defend against a partial surprise attack directed against American intercontinental ballistic missiles. When the negotiations succeeded and the investment stopped, the rationale remained, leaving an exaggerated problem without an easy solution. Meanwhile, parallel efforts to impose limits on offensive systems had the effect of encouraging a weak strategic theory emphasising the importance of perceptions of numerical comparisons.
`In' analytical NoteSurvival : the IISS Quarterly Vol. 64, No.2; Apr-May 2022: p.55-80
Journal SourceSurvival : the IISS Quarterly Vol: 64 No 2
Key WordsAnti-ballistic missile treaty ;  Arms Control ;  Anti-Ballistic Missiles ;  Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) ;  Multiple Independently Targeted re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs)Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)strategic theorysurprise attack


 
 
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