| ID | 187353 |
| Title Proper | Presence of Revenge in Conflict and the Possibility of Complete Deterrence |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Siqueira, Kevin ; Chen, Jingxian |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | We allow for the possibility of revenge in attacker-defender conflicts under a variety of settings including, for example, when one of the players faces a no-win situation. In a two-player two-period conflict where revenge stems from the grievances of one of the parties to the original conflict, we show that the presence of revenge can influence the amount of effort devoted to the conflict and may in certain circumstances, exacerbate it. We also give conditions when the presence of revenge can deter an attack altogether. |
| `In' analytical Note | Defence and Peace Economics Vol. 33, No.7; Nov 2022: p.805-817 |
| Journal Source | Defence and Peace Economics Vol: 33 No 7 |
| Key Words | Conflict ; Deterrence ; Revenge ; Contest-Success Function |