| ID | 188333 |
| Title Proper | Afghanistan and the COIN conundrum |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Mockaitis, Thomas R |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | America's longest war ended unceremoniously in August 2021 amid chaotic scenes of Afghan civilians storming the Kabul airport in a desperate effort to board a flight out of the country. The twenty-year war took the lives of 2,448 U.S. service members, 1,144 allied service members, 66,000 Afghan military and police, 3,846 U.S. contractors, 444 aid workers, 72 journalists, and 47,245 Afghan civilians as well as 51,191 Taliban and other insurgents.1 It cost the United States an estimated $2 trillion, billions of it spent on an Afghan army that collapsed in a matter of weeks.2 By any measure the mission was an utter failure bought at a terrible price in blood and treasure. While the current public argument focuses on assigning political blame, a more serious discussion has already begun. Debate rests on a broad fundamental question: Did failure result from mistakes made at crucial junctures during the campaign, or was the war unwinnable at a cost the United States could bear? |
| `In' analytical Note | Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol. 33, No.7; Oct 2022: p.1085-1092 |
| Journal Source | Small Wars and Insurgencies Vol: 33 No 7 |
| Key Words | Afghanistan ; COIN conundrum |