ID | 188891 |
Title Proper | Cyber Operations and Signaling |
Other Title Information | an Exchange – The Authors Reply |
Language | ENG |
Author | Lonergan, Shawn W ; Lonergan, Erica D |
Summary / Abstract (Note) | In response to our article, “Cyber Operations, Accommodative Signaling, and the De-Escalation of International Crises,” we are delighted to engage with three scholars: Brandon K. Yoder, Fiona S. Cunningham, and Michael P. Fischerkeller. By way of background, this project grew out of our prior research on cyber operations’ limitations for coercion and the paucity of evidence that cyber operations cause escalation.Footnote1 Our inherent intuition was that cyber operations may be useful for conveying an aversion to significantly escalate disputes for some of the same reasons they are poor tools of coercion—and that this could help account for the relatively robust empirical finding that cyber operations are not associated with crisis escalation.Footnote2 Therefore, one part of our argument rests on cyber operations’ relatively limited effects compared to other tools at a state’s disposal. |
`In' analytical Note | Security Studies Vol. 31, No.4; Aug-Sep 2022 : p.782-789 |
Journal Source | Security Studies Vol: 31 No 4 |
Key Words | Signaling ; Cyber Operations |