| ID | 188918 |
| Title Proper | Impact of Domestic Surveillance on Political Imprisonment |
| Other Title Information | Evidence from the German Democratic Republic |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Christoph Valentin Steinert ; Steinert, Christoph Valentin |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | How does domestic surveillance affect the frequency of political imprisonments in autocratic states? In contrast to conventional wisdom, I argue that surveillance reduces the frequency of political imprisonments in power-maximizing autocracies. Surveillance decreases uncertainty about the correct targets of repression, allowing for more selective detentions and shifts to silent instruments of repression. To investigate these claims, I draw on a unique county-level dataset of political imprisonment in the German Democratic Republic between 1984 and 1988. I proxy the number of monitored individuals with newly collected county-level data on surveillance operations. I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, random effects, and instrumental variable models to investigate the impact of surveillance on political imprisonment. I find that higher shares of spies per monitored individual were associated with a reduction of political imprisonment. Further, increasing levels of spy infiltration were linked to a systematic shift to silent instruments of repression. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 67, No.1; Jan 2023: p. 38-65 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol: 67 No 1 |
| Key Words | Intelligence ; Spying ; Domestic Surveillance ; Political Imprisonment ; Silent Repression ; Covert Repression |