| ID | 192675 |
| Title Proper | Great Doctrine Disaster |
| Other Title Information | Reform, Reaction, and Mechanization in the British Army, 1919–1939 |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Alaric Searle, ; Searle, Alaric |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Historians have argued that Britain lost its early lead in developing mechanized formations in the interwar period due to financial pressures, inter-arm rivalry, poor tank design, and the misjudgments of tank enthusiasts. A systematic examination of armor doctrine, however, demonstrates that British approaches were coherent and innovative until 1935. Progress was derailed by the suppression of the “Tank Training” (1935) manual and the decision to mechanize the cavalry rather than expand the Royal Tank Corps. Coordination between manuals of arms of service and the field service regulations was abandoned, moreover, in favor of multiple training pamphlets. The result was the “Great Doctrine Disaster” caused by fallacious assumptions about tank design, tactics, and the future battlefield. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Military History Vol. 87, No.3; Jul 2023: p.599–632 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Military History 2023-09 87, 3 |
| Key Words | British Army ; Great Doctrine Disaster ; 1919–1939 |