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ID193111
Title ProperCosts and Cover
Other Title InformationExplaining the Onset of Ceasefires in Civil Conflict
LanguageENG
AuthorClayton, Govinda
Summary / Abstract (Note)Ceasefires are common in civil conflict. Yet we have surprisingly little comparative analysis of why and under what conditions they occur. A ceasefire provides temporary relief from the costs of conflict, but also generates its own costs. Building on this logic, we argue that conflict parties are more likely to accept the costs associated with a ceasefire when the conflict costs are greater, in particular, when: violence is intense; there are higher levels of ‘collateral damage’; and the parties lack international support. Second, we contend that ceasefires are also more likely in those periods in which the audience costs associated with entering into an arrangement are lower, specifically, when the parties have some form of ‘political cover’, such as during mediation. We find support for both arguments in an analysis of a new dataset capturing all ceasefire in civil conflict from 1989-2020, using a series of dyad fixed effect models.
`In' analytical NoteJournal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 67, No.7-8; Aug-Sep 2023: p.1296-1324
Journal SourceJournal of Conflict Resolution Vol: 67 No 7-8
Key WordsConflict Management ;  Conflict Resolution ;  Civil Wars ;  Mediation ;  Internal armed Conflict ;  Dyadic Conflict ;  Ceasefires


 
 
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