| ID | 193858 |
| Title Proper | Delegation to Treaty Bodies and International Organizations for Conventional Arms Control Agreements in Europe |
| Other Title Information | A Sum Score Evaluation |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Lippert, William |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | What is the effect of delegation to an agreement executor, such as an international organization (IO), on the success of conventional arms control (CAC) agreements in Europe? Arms control agreements have taken different approaches to delegation. The extent of state delegation to treaty executors has ranged from nonexistent to substantial. Previous studies have not looked at delegation as an independent variable of CAC agreement success. This article applies a sum score methodology assessing nine variables in a dataset of nineteen CAC agreements in Europe over the past 100 years. There is a low correlation between delegation and CAC agreement success, though the data suggests that third-party state and IO involvement are the most significant variables related to success. This article proposes that high delegation to an IO with third-party state participation will increase the likelihood that a future CAC agreement between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Russia could succeed. |
| `In' analytical Note | Global Governance Vol. 30, No.1: Jan-Mar 2024: p.93–122 |
| Journal Source | Global Governance Vol: 30 No 1 |
| Key Words | International Organizations ; Delegation ; Conventional Arms Control ; Sum Score Methodology |