Item Details
Skip Navigation Links
   ActiveUsers:708Hits:36594497Skip Navigation Links
Show My Basket
Contact Us
IDSA Web Site
Ask Us
Today's News
HelpExpand Help
Advanced search

In Basket
  Journal Article   Journal Article
 

ID196070
Title ProperProvocation, Bargaining, and War
LanguageENG
AuthorCho, Hyun-Binn
Summary / Abstract (Note)The rationalist bargaining literature explains how public statements and military mobilizations can signal resolve. But recent political psychology scholarship shows how such actions can “provoke” targets, increasing their resolve by arousing emotions among their leaders and public. While rationalist models have largely omitted provocation, psychological approaches have neglected its strategic consequences. We model provocation in bargaining, assuming that a challenger’s signals endogenously increase the target’s resolve. Our model shows that introducing provocation can make signals of resolve more credible precisely because their provocative effects make them more costly to send. Moreover, against the prevailing intuition that provocation uniformly promotes conflict, the information from these signals can mitigate their provocative effects and elicit more generous offers than not signaling. Thus, in contrast to psychological accounts, we show that taking provocative actions can be rational and necessary for reaching peaceful bargains. We illustrate these findings with the 1911 Agadir Crisis.
`In' analytical NoteJournal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 68, No.7-8; Aug-Sep 2024: p. 1307-1331
Journal SourceJournal of Conflict Resolution Vol: 68 No 7-8
Key WordsGame Theory ;  Psychology ;  Provocation ;  Crisis Bargaining ;  Resolve ;  Signaling ;  Credibility ;  Agadir Crisis


 
 
Media / Other Links  Full Text