| ID | 196070 |
| Title Proper | Provocation, Bargaining, and War |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Cho, Hyun-Binn |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The rationalist bargaining literature explains how public statements and military mobilizations can signal resolve. But recent political psychology scholarship shows how such actions can “provoke” targets, increasing their resolve by arousing emotions among their leaders and public. While rationalist models have largely omitted provocation, psychological approaches have neglected its strategic consequences. We model provocation in bargaining, assuming that a challenger’s signals endogenously increase the target’s resolve. Our model shows that introducing provocation can make signals of resolve more credible precisely because their provocative effects make them more costly to send. Moreover, against the prevailing intuition that provocation uniformly promotes conflict, the information from these signals can mitigate their provocative effects and elicit more generous offers than not signaling. Thus, in contrast to psychological accounts, we show that taking provocative actions can be rational and necessary for reaching peaceful bargains. We illustrate these findings with the 1911 Agadir Crisis. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 68, No.7-8; Aug-Sep 2024: p. 1307-1331 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol: 68 No 7-8 |
| Key Words | Game Theory ; Psychology ; Provocation ; Crisis Bargaining ; Resolve ; Signaling ; Credibility ; Agadir Crisis |