| ID | 196074 |
| Title Proper | Just Patronage? Familiarity and the Diplomatic Value of Non-Career Ambassadors |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Goldfien, Michael A. |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Career diplomats have expertise. Why, then, do U.S. presidents appoint relative novices to key diplomatic posts? Conventional wisdom points to patronage. Yet this explanation overlooks the benefits of a diplomat’s familiarity with political superiors. Inherent in delegated diplomacy is uncertainty over diplomats' ability to “deliver” on understandings reached at the negotiating table. Non-career diplomats often speak more credibly for political superiors, creating an incentive for foreign counterparts to engage in diplomacy. I theorize a tradeoff between familiarity and expertise to generate empirically testable prediction. Counterintuitively, I expect that presidents often sacrifice professional expertise to delegate important diplomatic assignments to relative amateurs, even accounting for the patronage value of the post. I find empirical support for the argument using a novel dataset on U.S. ambassadorial appointments from the Reagan through Trump administrations. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 68, No.7-8; Aug-Sep 2024: p.1417-1442 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol: 68 No 7-8 |
| Key Words | Diplomacy ; Delegation ; Ambassadors ; Foreign Policy |