| ID | 196302 |
| Title Proper | Bureaucratic Informal Rules and State Infrastructural Power |
| Other Title Information | Local Governments’ Informal Land Administration in China |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Xie, Zhikui |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | Local governments in China often develop informal rules to address governance problems. However, existing research does not fully explore the causal relationship between the enforcement of radiating institutions and state infrastructural power, nor does it examine how informal rules affect state infrastructural power. This article aims to fill this gap by theorizing the existence of informal rules within the state bureaucracy and discussing their impact on state infrastructural power. It analyzes why and how local governments in China develop informal rules regarding land administration and bend regime-level formal land institutions from within. This article coins the term bureaucratic informal rules to describe this paradoxical combination of informality and authority demonstrated by the informal behavior of local governments. It identifies several mechanisms—displacement, conversion, drift, and layering—through which bureaucratic informal rules affect formal rules and state infrastructural power. The article also distinguishes between informal land administration and other informal rules involving local bureaucrats. Furthermore, it emphasizes the importance of institutional strength in discussions about state power and calls for greater attention to the sources of state strength. |
| `In' analytical Note | China Review Vol. 24, No.4; Nov 2024: p.1-32 |
| Journal Source | China Review 2024-12 24, 4 |
| Key Words | Local governments ; State Infrastructural Power ; Bureaucratic Informal Rules ; Informal Land Administration in China |