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ID196541
Title ProperArming Sheīkh Saīd
Other Title InformationConflict and Cooperation in Italian and British Imperial Policy in the Arabian Peninsula and the Red Sea, 1927-1940
LanguageENG
AuthorStrang, G Bruce
Summary / Abstract (Note)After the Great War, Imam Yahya, the spiritual and temporal ruler of Yemen, established control over the Yemeni highlands and fought wars against his rivals to extend his power. Jacopo Gasparini, the governor of Italy’s Eritrean colony, increased Italian trade with Yemen, primarily by shipping arms to Imam Yahya. Italian influence in the Arabian peninsula worried British officials. Britain’s primary goal was to protect its imperial road through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea by ensuring that no European Power established itself on the eastern shore or on strategic islands of the Red Sea. In 1927, Italy and Britain signed the Rome Understanding, agreeing to limit their imperial competition in the peninsula. Both parties maintained the Rome Understanding and its successor agreement in the 1938 Easter Accords until the outbreak of the Second World War, although both violated its spirit and letter when convenient. In the latter half of the 1930s, Imam Yahya wanted to acquire naval cannon to defend Sheīkh Saīd, a promontory that overlooked the strategically important Bab al-Mandeb Strait. Both Italian and British officials resisted providing them, as both feared that the other could seize Sheīkh Saīd and use these cannon to bar the southern exit of the Red Sea. After lengthy negotiations, the Italians eventually relented and shipped four naval cannon to Imam Yahya to try to earn his favour before the outbreak of Anglo-Italian conflict in World War Two. The episode of arming Sheīkh Saīd shows the nature of conflict and cooperation in Anglo-Italian relations in the Arabian Peninsula and the ultimate failure to reconcile their imperial interests.
`In' analytical NoteDiplomacy and Statecraft Vol. 35, No.3; Sep 2024: p.520-547
Journal SourceDiplomacy and Statecraft Vol:35 No 3
Key WordsConflict and Cooperation ;  Arming Sheīkh ;  Italian and British Imperial Policy ;  Arabian Peninsula and the Red Sea ;  1927-1940


 
 
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