| ID | 197116 |
| Title Proper | Delegating war initiation to machines |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Deeks, Ashley |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | The use of autonomy to initiate force, which states may begin to view as necessary to protect against hypersonic attacks and other forms of ‘hyperwar,’ may effectively constitute a delegation of war-initiation decision making to a machine. Yet legal questions about whether and when the leader of a country may delegate their decision making to others – and normative questions about whether he should do so – can be complicated. Any state that intends to introduce significant autonomy into such systems should assess whether and how the use of autonomy in war-initiation comports with its domestic laws and norms that govern the delegation of the use of force. |
| `In' analytical Note | Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 78, No.2; Apr 2024: p.148-153 |
| Journal Source | Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol: 78 No 2 |
| Key Words | Use of force ; United States ; Autonomy ; President ; Delegation ; Congress ; Artificial Intelligence (AI) |