| ID | 198619 |
| Title Proper | Politics of Delay in Crisis Negotiations |
| Language | ENG |
| Author | Dong, Haonan |
| Summary / Abstract (Note) | States often intentionally stall crisis negotiations, hoping to build arms or attract allies to achieve a more favorable bargaining position. Why do their adversaries tolerate delay in some cases, but attack upon delay in others? I argue that this is because states cannot perfectly distinguish between intentional and unavoidable delays. This presents a strategic tension: a state prefers to attack preventively if the delay is intentional, but prefers to avoid costly war otherwise. To study this tension, I build a formal model of crisis bargaining with delay tactics, showing that rising states may mask bargaining delays behind natural exogenous delays to complete a peaceful power shift. I find that uncertainty over the source of delay may decrease the risk of war under some conditions, and increase the risk of war under others. I discuss the implications of my theoretical model for the causes of war and power shifts in historical cases. |
| `In' analytical Note | Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 69, No.5; May 2025: p.793 - 813 |
| Journal Source | Journal of Conflict Resolution 2025-05 69, 5 |
| Key Words | Conflict ; Game Theory ; Interstate Conflict ; Negotiation ; Bargaining ; Power War |