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| 1 |
ID:
191881
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| Summary/Abstract |
The National Security Act of 1947 was neither the first nor the last legislative word on intelligence coordination. Instead, it was the second of three formative, although not formidable, acts of Congress that have provided models for U.S. intelligence coordination: the Contingent Fund for Foreign Intercourse, the National Security Act of 1947, and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. This article reveals how the debate over intelligence coordination in the United States reaches back further than existing accounts that examine the origins of the Central Intelligence Agency. This article also uses the theme of intelligence coordination to introduce a new chronology for U.S intelligence history.
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| 2 |
ID:
191887
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| Summary/Abstract |
Proponents of “diversity, equity, and inclusion” (DEI) in intelligence make two basic claims: (1) preferential hiring and promotions for minorities, women, LGBTQ+ people, and disabled persons is good, ethically and politically; and (2) the preferences improve the operational performance of intelligence agencies. This article addresses the second assertion, finds that DEI proponents have failed to provide evidence to support their position, and concludes that preferences for domestically-defined demographic groups cannot improve the performance of foreign-focused intelligence services. Such claims primarily reflect ideological views popular in government and the academy as well as the personal, parochial interests of persons from the favored groups. Instead, the traditional view of the value of diversity remains accurate: capable individual persons with different skills from all major demographic groups are primary drivers of excellent intelligence performance.
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| 3 |
ID:
191886
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| Summary/Abstract |
This research investigates the life of Chinese communist secret police chief Deng Fa and his pioneering influence on the profession of political policing. The Chinese secret police handle intelligence and counterintelligence duties in addition to suppressing political dissent. During the revolutionary period, the secret police’s neutralization of hidden threats proved critical to the Chinese Communist Party’s rise to power. The present-day secret police still stand guard for the party-state while closely observing its revolutionary traditions. Through examining Deng Fa and his professional legacy, this article hopes to contribute to the academic discourse on China studies and intelligence studies.
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| 4 |
ID:
191885
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| Summary/Abstract |
The challenge of this article is on deciding the two-decade-old controversy among Israeli intelligence scholars and practitioners over what caused the outbreak of the Palestinian uprising in October 2000. The question remains: Was it preplanned by the Palestinian Authority or a spontaneous response to the violence that ensued following the visit to the Temple Mount by Israeli opposition leader Sharon, which was seriously escalated by Israel’s excessive military response? Drawing on a theoretical framework of two types of strategic surprises, the article clarifies the controversy and explains the outbreak of what became a long and bloody Israeli–Palestinian confrontation.
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| 5 |
ID:
191889
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| Summary/Abstract |
A historical perspective aids our understanding of the present and capacity to anticipate the future. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, but particularly its brutality and policy of “constructive destruction,” was shocking and unexpected, but faced with Russia’s relegation from superpower status, it was always a possibility that Putin would emulate Stalin’s determination to maintain Russian influence in the world and challenge the West’s dominance. The risk of recurrent totalitarianism borne of the fear, distrust, and mutual demonization which characterized the ideological rivalry of the early Cold War years has led to a search for historical analogies of relevance to the growing East/West tensions of today that threaten to bring about a second Cold War or limited nuclear conflict. The motivating ideology for Russian expansionism is no longer Communism, but a mythical narrative that promotes Russian nationalism, patriotism, and exceptionalism. Putin’s authoritarian state with its concentration of power and recourse to propaganda, disinformation, and lies is daily looking more Stalinesque and the Cold War question—how to contain Russian ambition—remains to be answered. While the focus has so far been on Stalin’s geopolitical strategy regarding Russia’s near neighbors, two books about the first post–World War II defection in 1945 merit re-visiting for the in-depth analysis and insights they provide into the period and the mindset of participants caught up in that affair. The defector, Igor Gouzenko, a Russian cyber clerk, insisted that Russia was preparing for a Third World War. His revelations precipitated the start of the Cold War.
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| 6 |
ID:
191882
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the impact of the National Security Act of 1947 on signals intelligence (SIGINT)’s organization and activities in the early Cold War. Although mostly a blind spot, the study of how the legislation relates to SIGINT serves to underscore the influence that the armed services exerted on the design and operation of the Intelligence Community (IC). SIGINT activities were impeded by the flaws of the legislation, which failed to unify the armed forces and created instead a decentralized national security apparatus. Although SIGINT was eventually centralized within the Department of Defense, it was to remain outside the Central Intelligence Agency’s purview, thus turning the nascent IC into a diarchy led by both the director of central intelligence and the secretary of defense.
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| 7 |
ID:
191884
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article analyzes the postservice lives of Soviet and Russian intelligence and state security officers to explore the meanings behind the phrase, “There is no such thing as a former chekist” (“Бывших чекистов не бывает”). The article analyzes four possible scenarios in which a Soviet/Russian intelligence or state security officer might be considered “former,” organized around the concepts of legitimate and illegitimate ways of leaving the service, as well as genuine and deceptive reasons. Those two concept pairs create a matrix of possibilities for Soviet intelligence and state security personnel who consider leaving the service: legitimate/genuine, made up of officers who leave with no negative ramifications; legitimate/deceptive, made up of officers who claim to leave the service but remain connected; illegitimate/genuine, made up of defectors and arrested officers; and illegitimate/deceptive, made up of false defectors. Whether the statement “there is no such thing as a former chekist” is true depends on whom one asks: those who claim to have genuinely left the service would refute the statement, while those who are still in a Russian intelligence or state security service, as well as those whose departure is not genuine, hold firmly to it.
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| 8 |
ID:
191879
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| Summary/Abstract |
A summary of counterintelligence threat chokepoints from the perspectives of the United States, Israel, the European Union, Nordic countries, and South Africa are presented. These chokepoints seem to stem from geopolitical competitiveness and manifest as espionage, subversion, terrorism, and covert action in any accessible domain possible. The discussion of threat focus areas has been chosen after consideration of the ontology of such threats, including new security challenges like hybrid threats, grey-zone influences, and some specific threats propagated by the COVID-19 pandemic. The discussion concludes with a brief view on counterintelligence threat enablers, accelerators, and effects. The aim is to provide a comparative view of existing counterintelligence threats, agendas, and threat responses to increase both awareness and resilience.
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| 9 |
ID:
191880
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| Summary/Abstract |
International cooperation between intelligence services poses a dilemma. It is an important tool in countering today’s complex transnational threats, but at the same time, cooperation is a risky business. Intelligence services can never be sure that a partner will reciprocate in kind. Scholars and practitioners often identify trust as one of the foremost conditions to overcome this dilemma. Yet the notion of trust is seldomly conceptualized in these rational-calculative explanations. Contrary to the common view that intelligence services are exceptional in their opportunism and rivalry, social relations and trustworthiness perceptions provide a more dominant explanation for the level of cooperation between intelligence partners than is often assumed by scholars and practitioners. Known reputations, recognized professional standards, and shared traits socially bind intelligence professionals to their community of practice, enabling them to bridge divides like nationality and even conflicting interests. Intelligence services resemble many other organizations in the public and private domains, requiring a de-exceptionalization of their international cooperation.
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| 10 |
ID:
191888
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| Summary/Abstract |
Traditionally, security issues in Colombia have been operated by military institutions with a high percentage of male participation. Since the creation of the National Intelligence Directorate (NID) in 2011, this masculinized and militarized environment of security issues has been transformed by the creation of a civilian institution with 45.7% female participation in highly recognized profiles. The participation of women in the institution has exposed socioemotional skills that characterize their strategic role at the NID. To research how gender distinction in socioemotional skills influences intelligence processes within the NID, eight semistructured interviews were conducted with seven women and one man, and a specialized literature review on the building of socioemotional skills distinction by gender was carried out. There were three main results: first, the NID has gender parity because, being a civilian agency, it clashes with a masculinized tradition of other military-based national intelligence agencies; second, the representative participation of women in strategic roles within the NID demonstrates that their socioemotional skills are a useful resource for intelligence activity; third, on the one hand, the overexploitation of socioemotional skills and “smart intelligence” leads to overburdening women in their tasks and responsibilities on both professional and personal levels, but on the other hand, it is harder for women to show results and be recognized for their work in the Colombian Intelligence Community.
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| 11 |
ID:
191883
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| Summary/Abstract |
During the Cold War, France remained a soft touch for Soviet intelligence. Among the large communist population—war veterans and about 25% of the postwar electorate—Soviets found fertile ground for recruiting agents and collaborators who would betray their country, although it is fair to say most philosophical and political communists did not engage in espionage. Spy rings led by the State Committee for Security (KGB) and Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) controllers in the Russian embassy’s rezidence overwhelmed French security precautions. In addition, the Soviet espionage apparatus maintained an extensive infrastructure in the Moscow Center that supported quantitative intelligence collected in France on a massive scale. The addition of agents from satellite countries stretched French counterintelligence beyond its limits. All this is not to say that French security was completely ineffective. Security agencies unmasked spies and arrested hundreds for espionage; so too, hundreds of Soviets with diplomatic immunity were expelled. French security also benefited from consequential defections of Soviet agents and the crowning but fortuitous achievement of a mole inside the KGB itself. But poor French security exacerbated deteriorating relations with the United States and compromised North Atlantic Treaty Organization secrets. Regardless of the détente between East and West, Soviet espionage continued unabated.
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