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HUTH, PAUL
(4)
answer(s).
Srl
Item
1
ID:
050908
Comparative public health: the political economy of comparative
/ Ghobarah, Hazem Adam; Huth, Paul; Russett, Bruce
March 2004
Ghobarah, Hazem Adam
Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication
March 2004.
Key Words
World Economy
;
World Development Policy
;
World Health Organisation
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2
ID:
076161
Covenantswithout the sword: international law and the protection of civilians in times of war
/ Valentino, Benjamin; Huth, Paul; Croco, Sarah
Huth, Paul
Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication
2006.
Key Words
Civiliansin Tmes of War
;
Civil War
;
International Law
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3
ID:
053443
Draining the sea: Mass killing and Guerrilla warfare
/ Valentino, Benjamin; Huth, Paul; Balch-Lindsay, Dylan
Spring 2004
Huth, Paul
Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication
Spring 2004.
Key Words
Insurgency
;
Guerrilla Warfare
;
Military Threat
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4
ID:
111738
Law and the use of force in world politics: the varied effects of law on the exercise of military power in territorial disputes
/ Huth, Paul; Croco, Sarah; Appel, Benjamin
Huth, Paul
Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication
2012.
Summary/Abstract
In this paper, we investigate how international law shapes leaders' decisions regarding the use of force in the context of territorial disputes. We argue that if the legal principles relevant to the dispute are capable of suggesting a focal point, international law will have a powerful role to play in informing leader behavior. Specifically, if a focal point exists, the state that it favors will avoid using force and prefer negotiations when considering an initial challenge to the status quo. However, we expect focal points to have the opposite effect once states are involved in a militarized dispute. Under these circumstances, the state with a legal advantage will be more likely to escalate the level of military force. Using a series of statistical tests, we find strong support for our theoretical argument.
Key Words
World Politics
;
Use of force
;
Military Power
;
Territorial Disputes
;
International Law
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