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1 |
ID:
058009
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2 |
ID:
184081
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Summary/Abstract |
On 12 November 2019 Baha Abu al-Ata, a leader of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza was targeted assassinated by Israel. Intelligence was the driver of the operation – information and data were the components of intelligence gathering enabling informed decision-making via defence and security analysis. There was effective co-ordination and co-operation between the civilian government, the Israel Defense Force’s Units Skylark, Moran, 504, 8200 and 9900, and the Israel Security Agency. Policy and technicalities were integrated through civil–military relations. The methodology used six sets of different types of intelligence gathering, analysis and risk assessment that were separate yet simultaneously were asking: why, who, when, where, how (what weapon), and assessing repercussions.
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3 |
ID:
187059
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Summary/Abstract |
Since October 2020 there is a new actor in Israel’s maritime space and energy sector after the Chevron Corporation acquired Noble Energy. This article examines the first year under the headings: financial aspects, regional politics, the UAE and the Abraham Accords, the EastMed natural gas pipeline, security aspects, Chevron and local companies and scandals and environmental aspects. The analysis determines the historical significances and projects ways forward, for a win–win outcome for Chevron and Israel. Chevron has ability to make the EastMed pipeline happen may also have positive ramifications for regional politics. Israel as a regulator will not permit Chevron to gain a larger stake of the gas fields, or even increase prices to the IEC and so to consumers. Israel will aim to ensure that Chevron will not cut corners that could result in labour issues, health and safety dangers, and environmental catastrophe. The Israel Navy has procured four new warships, to meet the gas fields’ direct security needs, permitting a Brown Water doctrine shift while enabling enhanced power projection capability.
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4 |
ID:
192073
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Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the threat analysis across Africa that should be included in Force Design 2030 (FD2030) for the United States Marine Corps. FD2030 is a strategic guidance document with emphasis on Great Power Competition with China, Russia, Korea, Iran and violent extremist organisations. Africa is not mentioned. This is a notable omission, given that high-level interventions by the Marines in the past to Africa have not been overtly successful. Given geo-strategic significances and hot spots, it is inevitable that the Marines will be deployed again landward to Africa or seaward of the continent. Recommendations are made to be included in the document based upon lessons learned from failures in Somalia, Libya and Lebanon and successes in Syria and Iraq, and the experiences of others – France in Mali and Burkina Faso and United States Africa Command. Great Power Competition, violent extremist organisations and the grey-zone phenomenon across Africa are scrutinised, as are intelligence, counterintelligence and hybrid warfare.
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