| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Recent research on strategic conflict avoidance and targeting in the American case shows that states avoid militarily challenging presidents whose domestic situations might be improved by diversionary conflict, and that congressional opposition to presidential foreign policy invites increased challenges by decreasing other states' perceptions of likely American resolve. This article seeks to refine these lines of research by considering the intervening effects of partisan ideology. As previous scholarship indicates that diversion is a more attractive option for conservative than for liberal governments, there are likely greater incentives for other states to strategically avoid Republicans given lagging economic conditions. Conversely, the relative liberal aversion to military ventures means that the resolve-undermining effects of congressional opposition are likely more pronounced for Democrats. Analyses of the American foreign policy experience from 1949 to 2001 provide support for these hypotheses, as increases in the misery index are related to substantial decreases in the militarized targeting of Republican administrations and congressional foreign policy opposition acts are related to substantial increases in the militarized targeting of Democratic administrations.
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