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ID:
023844
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Publication |
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976.
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Description |
viii, 303p.Pbk
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Standard Number |
0521290783
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
016763 | 909.82/CAM 016763 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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2 |
ID:
129433
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3 |
ID:
133264
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
After nearly seven years of ever-escalating violence related to the Mexican 'war on drugs', in 2013 Mexico entered the International Crisis Group's (icg) 'observatory' of countries facing a violent crisis. In this article we critically interrogate this 'Mexican turn' of the icg, as well as its accompanying forms of crisis knowledge production. By applying analytical insights from critical policy analysis and postcolonial security studies, we highlight the Western-centrism embedded in the icg's perspective on Mexico's security crisis. In analysing this perspective on questions of drug trafficking, statehood and indigenous justice, we demonstrate how this Western-centrism produces a de-politicising and overly technocratic crisis narrative. The article concludes that, through its Western-centric 'Mexican turn', the icg has been able to reaffirm its standing as a uniquely influential and internationally recognised crisis expert by showcasing its awareness of newly emerging crisis situations, as well as its possession of the necessary crisis-solving expertise.
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4 |
ID:
086854
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Publication |
2009.
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Summary/Abstract |
An escalating security crisis in Mexico threatens to spill over into the southern United States. In formulating its response, the US must face the reality that it is part of the problem as well as the solution.
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5 |
ID:
151173
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6 |
ID:
108568
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Publication |
2011.
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Summary/Abstract |
Despite constant fluctuations between tensions and detente on the Korean peninsula,
the crisis in 2010, including the Cheonan sinking and the Yeonpyong Island
shelling has proved to become the most dangerous in decades-without obvious
new reasons or new contradictions to justify it. After President Lee Myung Bak's
coming to power in South Korea, Pyongyang developed suspicions over his new
hard-line stance and demands for denuclearization. North Korea thought that
Seoul's call for reforms were merely a cover to undermine their regime and it
took seriously the desire by Southern conservatives for "early reunification" and
thus resorted to military provocations. Meanwhile, the U.S. Obama administration
chose to abstain from any meaningful policy toward North Korea, while China
played a more active role in supporting Pyongyang and Russian policy, which is
based on the priority of peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. All issues
should be decided by political and diplomatic means without the use of force,
threats, pressure, or isolation. Improvements in North-South relations, DPRK
dialogue with the West, and a multilateral format are essential prerequisites for
realizing a new security system in Korea that takes into account the interests of all
parties. Only this can avert a new crisis. The author suggests a return to engagement
and the promotion of slow evolutionary changes in North Korea by giving the
current ruling elite tangible guarantees of security on the condition that the North
would change its domestic and international behavior.
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7 |
ID:
100383
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8 |
ID:
089347
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Publication |
2009.
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Summary/Abstract |
Following the 2006 gang violence in Timor-Leste amid dissension between the two main security institutions in the country, the Timor-Leste Defence Force (F-FDTL) and the National Police of Timor-Leste (PNTL), the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1704, establishing a UN multidimensional, integrated mission, including UN police with an executive policing mandate, to ensure the restoration and maintenance of public security. With the mission winding down in 2009, this article offers an early assessment of its accomplishments and setbacks in the realm of security and public order, emphasizing the UNPOL leg of the mission. If the mission succeeded in restoring a modicum of security in Timor-Leste, it fell short of effectively assisting the PNTL reform process, implying that another security crisis erupting in the country cannot be ruled out.
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